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Introduction 
 
The majority of social scientists – including anthropologists, economists and sociologists –
agree that the environment in which individuals live, work and socialize plays a central role in their 
range of opportunities and quality of life.1  A substantial body of research specifically highlights the 
deleterious effects that socially isolated and economically deprived neighborhoods can have on 
individuals.  This type of segregation from mainstream society is too often the fate of poor, urban 
African Americans.  Residents of these neighborhoods experience not only physical isolation from 
jobs, quality housing and amenities, but also social isolation from individuals and institutions that 
inhibits formation of diverse social networks and participation in civic life.2  The results of this 
isolation are believed to be more detrimental to children,3 but are manifested throughout the 
community in the form of poor educational institutions and outcomes, incarceration of youth and 
high levels of adult unemployment and underemployment.4 
While social science researchers agree that neighborhood conditions influence opportunity, 
public policy developers and analysts are less consistent in their beliefs regarding the interaction of 
place and individual outcomes.5  Despite this disagreement on causality, both “place-based” and 
“people-based” strategies have been proposed and implemented as a means of increasing 
opportunity for residents of poor neighborhoods.  Though no consensus exists regarding which is 
more effective or efficient, Avis Vidal (1995) contends that being able to declare the universal 
superiority of one approach or the other is not the issue: 
The relevant policy issue is not people versus place or strengthening 
poor neighborhoods versus dispersing their residents and somehow 
starting over; rather the issue is whether and under what 
circumstances specific interventions targeted to, and tailored to the 
needs of, disadvantaged neighborhoods have a constructive role in 
the policy portfolio.6 
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Given the growing disparity in income levels and continued concentration of poverty in the 
United States today, determining the most appropriate strategic direction in a given context is a key 
policy issue.  In this paper, I explore what types and combinations of programs appear most 
promising for increasing the opportunity of residents of the distressed neighborhoods of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.  I begin with a review of Galster and Killen’s conceptual framework of the “geography 
of opportunity.”  In the following section, I examine the results of exemplar programs of each type 
and offer broad suggestions of the contexts in which each type may be most appropriately used.  I 
offer a brief description of the geography of opportunity in Milwaukee as well as past and current 
efforts to enhance this geography.  I conclude with an assessment of how both types of 
development strategies (place- and people-based) might be most effectively implemented in 
Milwaukee in the future. 
Neighborhood Effects and the Geography of Opportunity  
 
According to Galster and Zobel’s (1998) review of relevant literature, most empirical 
research indicates that the environment in which individuals live, work and socialize influences their 
decision-making and perceived life opportunities.  However, they also point out that no consensus 
has been reached on why and how neighborhoods affect individuals or which social outcomes result 
from specific neighborhood factors.7  Researchers point to physical factors such as isolation and 
segregation, as well as economic and psychological dimensions including local poverty rate and 
relative lack of stability or support networks, as potential explanatory variables in the inferior 
outcomes of many poor inner city residents.  Results indicate that the “effects” corresponding to 
these “causes” include poor cognitive development, low educational attainment and behavioral 
problems in children, while teens may experience increased high school dropout rates, delinquency 
(criminal behavior and drug use) and childbearing during their adolescent years.  Clearly, many of 
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these decisions can affect adult outcomes related to marriage, household formation (e.g., female-
headed households) and ultimately poverty status.  Research also indicates that neighborhood effects 
may not act uniformly across genders or racial groups, making understanding the ways in which they 
operate more complex and even more important.8 
In their 1995 work,9 Galster and Killen develop a formal framework that attempts to 
elucidate the way in which neighborhood characteristics affect residents’ decision making.  They 
model the opportunity structure faced by inner-city youth in making life decisions related to 
education, employment, fertility, criminal activity and so on.  The authors take as given that 
metropolitan areas are highly spatially differentiated, in terms of socioeconomic status, public and 
private resources and social conditions that can be viewed as elements of economic opportunity.  
The hypothesis that follows from this status quo is that 
the geography of metropolitan opportunity is changing in such a way 
that a growing cadre of inner-city youth are [sic] persuaded to make 
decisions that ultimately lock them into a state of deprivation.10 
The conceptual framework outlined by Galster and Killen involves two interrelated 
dimensions of opportunity:  the “metropolitan opportunity structure” (process dimension) and the 
“perceived opportunity set” (prospect dimension).  These two aspects of the geography of 
opportunity are strongly intertwined, coming together in an often mutually reinforcing way to shape 
individuals’ interactions with society.  The metropolitan opportunity structure is described as “the 
way markets, institutions, and service delivery systems…utilize and modify the innate and acquired 
characteristics of participants.”11  That is, it is the framework in which indelible endowments (e.g., 
race and gender) and acquired attributes (e.g., education and skills) are evaluated by those in 
positions of authority (e.g., potential employers, landlords, service providers, etc.) in their decision-
making processes.  This structure is exogenous to the individual and is a socially constructed 
environment in which the individual must carry out the functions of daily life. 
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In contrast, the perceived opportunity set is defined as the “prospective socioeconomic 
outcomes that people believe will occur if they make particular decisions.”12  These associations 
between actions and outcomes can be affected by an individual’s indelible endowments, acquired 
attributes and his/her subjective perceptions of how society functions.13  In summary, Galster and 
Killen contend that variations in opportunity are shaped in two ways:  (1) through literal variations 
in opportunities from place to place and (2) through variations in the values, aspirations, perceptions 
and preferences of individuals living in those places.14 
Galster and Killen observe that the metropolitan opportunity structure’s variability from one 
place to another does not dictate that it provide individuals with inherently unequal opportunities.  
They define “equal opportunity” as comprised of four components:15 
(1) Individuals with equal endowments are treated equally; 
(2) Some endowments (e.g., race and gender) are not used as the basis for unequal treatment; 
(3) Markets and institutions have equal resources and policies across a metropolitan area; and 
(4) Households have equal ability to live in the areas they deem most desirable. 
The latter two components are not traditionally included in other researchers’ definitions, but are 
strongly advocated by the authors as key to ensuring equality of opportunities.  As place of residence 
determines individuals’ access to institutions and markets, they highlight the role that housing and 
mortgage markets play in hindering equality of opportunity for low-income and minority 
households.  They cite racial and ethnic discrimination as well as segregation of dwellings by price or 
rent levels as major obstacles to household residential choice.  Furthermore, they point out that if 
households had free choice in housing location, the access to equal institutions and markets would 
not be a concern, as households could freely sort themselves across a metropolitan area according to 
their individual preferences.16 
The 1970s “managerialist” approach of urban social geography Ray Pahl reinforces Galster 
and Killen’s assertion that allocation of resources among a metropolitan area’s markets and 
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institutions shapes individuals’ opportunities.17  Pahl emphasizes the impact that the distribution of 
and access to scarce resources has on individuals, particularly when resources are controlled and 
allocated by an elite, influential group within society.  Similar to Winston Churchill’s 1924 
contention that “we shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us,” he believes that 
this spatial pattern of resources both reflects and determines the social structure of the individuals 
that interact with it.  Pahl identifies two types of factors leading to inequalities in allocation and 
access: spatial constraints on access (in terms of time/cost distance) and social constraints on access 
(in terms of distribution of power and the existence of bureaucratic gatekeepers).  He asserts that 
holding economic status constant, this differential allocation of and access to resources result in 
unequal opportunities and inevitable societal conflict.  He also notes that the “sheer permanence of 
the built environment” dictates that the social structure created in one time period tends to be highly 
resistant to change in subsequent periods.  This perspective is clearly a precursor to Galster and 
Killen’s contention that the processes for allocating resources to local markets and institutions 
shapes the metropolitan opportunity structure that individuals face. 
In addition to the processes that govern opportunities (including resource allocation and 
residential choice), individuals’ perceptions of those processes play a significant role in achievement 
and life decisions.  Perceptions are shaped by the information that individuals have available to 
them, through either personal experiences or those of the members of their social networks.  This 
may be problematic in that information provided by family, neighbors, friends and local institutions 
will vary in quality and depth and be distorted to some extent, likely reflecting and reinforcing the 
neighborhood’s values and social norms.18  Individuals filter this information through the lens of 
their respective social networks, “inculcat[ing]…the predominant group’s norms, values and 
acceptable behavioral patterns into the young.”19  Social psychological studies concur that lack of 
diverse opinions within a group (e.g., neighborhood) makes individuals more likely to acquiesce to 
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majority opinion when conflicted.20  Problems can arise when the social networks of inner city youth 
convey the view that few options are viable for them, causing them to react by making impulsive 
decisions.21  Thus, in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty where resident diversity is limited, 
individuals may be less inclined to make decisions that are beyond the bounds of the social status 
quo, even if common sense and their own best interests indicate that they should act otherwise.  
This tends to lead to poor decisions in significant areas of youths’ lives, further limiting their future 
opportunity sets and those of subsequent generations.22  Once in place, social and behavioral norms 
may become powerful constraints on what residents perceive as viable or attractive life choices.23 
One might posit that social exposure to successful neighbors should have a positive effect 
on the perceived opportunity of disadvantaged individuals.  While many scholars agree with Galster 
and Killen that the nature of one’s local social network has a significant impact on perceptions of 
opportunity, the traditional holding that “advantaged” neighbors exert a positive influence on their 
less advantaged counterparts is not universally supported.24  The traditional view is that advantaged 
neighbors are an asset because they provide positive peer influence, collective socialization to 
mainstream behaviors and institutional models.  That is, children with good behavior will be a 
positive influence on peers, and “responsible” adults serve as behavioral enforcers and positive role 
models for neighbors with less socially acceptable behavior patterns.  On the other hand, some 
critics view advantaged neighbors as a negative influence on a neighborhood to the extent that they 
increase residents’ awareness (and resentment) of their own relative deprivation, create cultural 
conflict and increase intra-neighborhood competition for scarce resources.  Finally, economists tend 
to take a strongly individualist standpoint and view advantaged neighbors as completely irrelevant in 
shaping the experiences of their less advantaged neighbors.  They contend that as rational 
maximizers, individuals are in theory unaffected by their neighbors’ actions.  Thus, mixed-income 
communities may have positive, negative or neutral impact on disadvantaged residents. 
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Galster and Killen’s framework brings together the process and prospect dimensions of the 
model (opportunity structure and perceived opportunity set, respectively) to explain individuals’ 
decision-making behavior in the context of their environments.  The model asserts that individuals 
decide how to allocate their time among leisure, education, work (legal income-production) and 
crime (illegal income production) in order to maximize their overall utility, or well being (timing of 
fertility and marriage decisions are similarly decided).25  These decisions are not made in a vacuum, 
but rather take into account an individual’s indelible and malleable characteristics as well as his/her 
perceptions of how those characteristics will affect available opportunities.  Galster and Killen 
complete their argument by defining multiple formal functions relating inputs (individual 
characteristics, opportunity structure and local social network) to specific choices that individuals 
make (e.g., level and quality of education, involvement in criminal activity, etc.).26  They propose this 
set of simultaneous and changeable functions as a conceptual framework through which to 
understand the complexity of contextual decision making. 
Enhancing the Geography of Opportunity 
 
Galster and Killen’s framework suggests that an individual’s geography of opportunity can 
be changed for better or worse in two ways:  by altering the opportunity structure the individual 
faces or by affecting the individual’s perceived opportunity set.  Neither alternative is a 
straightforward undertaking.  The opportunity structure may be changed in place, through economic 
and community development programs, or the individual may choose to move to a location in 
which an improved opportunity structure already exists.  Changing the opportunity structure of a 
community is a difficult undertaking, but changing an individual’s perception of opportunity may be 
even more daunting if one considers the factors of personal motivation and trust.  If one perceives 
that the opportunity structure scorns his/her indelible endowments, he/she has no incentive to 
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enhance his/her acquired attributes.  For example, if an African American woman believes she will 
be denied employment opportunities because of her gender and race, she perceives no return on 
investment in education, skills or other work experience.  The difficulty of overcoming such barriers 
for a large proportion of a place’s population suggests that altering the opportunity structure that 
individuals face may be the more feasible alternative.  The remainder of this paper focuses on 
improving the opportunity structure as the requisite first step in improving the broader geography of 
opportunity. 
In the policy arena, there is a divergence of opinions regarding whether disadvantaged 
individuals are best helped by facilitating “place prosperity” or “people prosperity.”  Most anti-
poverty policies attempt either to enhance the opportunities available to individuals, with residential 
location held constant or move individuals from their current neighborhoods into those with more 
plentiful opportunities.  The two primary strategies for improving the geography of opportunity for 
low-income individuals follow the rationale of this “place vs. people” dispute:  community 
development and residential mobility (or “dispersal”), respectively.  I will consider these alternatives 
in turn, addressing how each type of program generally functions and the results that they have been 
able to achieve.  The final portion of this section discusses in what contexts each approach might be 
most applicable and effective. 
Community and Economic Development Programs 
Community and economic development programs aim to improve opportunities for low-
income individuals by increasing opportunities in their neighborhoods and attracting middle- and 
upper-income households to poor neighborhoods via redevelopment initiatives.  These efforts can 
take countless forms, including investments in physical infrastructure (e.g., street improvements, 
transit, etc.), formal infrastructure (e.g., public, private and non-profit organizations and the 
relationships among them) or informal infrastructure like social and organizational networks (i.e., 
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social capital).27  In general, community development directs efforts at revitalizing the fabric of the 
community for current and future residents alike. 
A number of federal programs exist to foster community and economic development in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, though no single initiative dominates the effort.  Among the most 
familiar and widely used federal programs are those focused exclusively on provision of affordable 
housing, including the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) and the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit.  Other programs address broader community and economic development 
issues such as employment, business development and physical property rehabilitation:  Renewal 
Communities/Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities (RC/EZ/EC), the Historic 
Rehabilitation Tax Credit (HRTC), the Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) 
and the relatively recently established New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).  The objectives and design 
of each program vary, as do their results. 
Authorized under Title II of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, 
HOME is the largest federal affordable housing block grant to states and localities.  Approximately 
$2 billion is allocated nationwide each year to state and local governments.  HOME allocations may 
be used to fund activities that include grants, loans, credit enhancements (e.g., loan guarantees), site 
acquisition or improvement costs, rental assistance or security deposits for low-income households 
and local organizations that address their housing needs.  HOME is designed to serve the segment 
of the population earning less than 80% of HUD-adjusted median family income (MFI), with 
particular emphasis on those households earning less than 50% to 60% of FMI.  To ensure that 
HOME funds are leveraged with other resources (particularly via public-private partnerships), 
recipient governments are required to match each HOME dollar with $0.25 of nonfederal funding.  
As of March 2004, HOME has led to the construction, rehabilitation or acquisition of more than 
750,000 units of affordable housing and leveraged more than $24 billion of nonfederal investment in 
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doing so (relative to $8 billion of federal investment).28  HOME’s emphasis on flexibility has 
contributed greatly to its success in providing affordable housing. 
The LIHTC was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to encourage private investment in 
development of low-income multifamily rental housing.  A developer will typically form a limited 
partnership with equity investors who, in return for up-front financing, receive federal tax credits 
over a ten-year period.  The LIHTC is approximately 9% of eligible costs if used for non-federally 
funded new construction and 4% if applied to a federally-subsidized project or one that involves 
acquisition and rehabilitation of an existing property.29  Additionally, to be eligible for the LIHTC, 
the housing development must meet one of the two minimum set-aside requirements: 
• 20% of units affordable to tenants with incomes at or below 50% of area gross median 
income (GMI) or 
• 40% of units affordable to tenants with incomes at or below 60% of area GMI.30 
Applicable income limits vary by location and family size, and rents must be restricted to HUD-
defined levels for a period of at least 15 years to avoid tax credit recapture by the federal 
government.  Currently, the HUD LIHTC database includes information on nearly 19,700 projects 
comprising over 935,000 housing units placed in service between 1987 and 2000.31  Effectively 
attracting private investor equity has been a significant development in the field of affordable 
housing provision. 
The federal RC/EZ/EC initiative was launched in 1993 to help create “self-sustaining, long-
term development in distressed urban and rural areas”32 across the U.S.  As of 2003, HUD and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had designated a combined 40 RCs (including 12 rural), 40 
EZs (including 10 rural) and 97 ECs (including 48 rural).33  The program aims to meet its goals by 
providing businesses with the opportunity to receive a flexible combination of tax credits, tax 
deductions and/or grant funding for qualified economic development activities in these distressed 
census tracts.  Wage credits are available for employment of zone residents, particularly hiring of 
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residents with special employment needs or those participating in the Welfare-to-Work program.  
Deductions include those for property acquisition, rehabilitation and environmental clean-up.  The 
spectrum of RC/EZ/EC incentives has encouraged “partners [to] reinvigorate[e] many communities 
that have been in decline for decades. Businesses are opening or expanding, residents have greater 
access to jobs, services, and new economic opportunities, and crime and violence are down.”34 
When implemented at the state level, EZs provide incentives for capital and labor 
investment in a somewhat different fashion.  First and foremost, it should be noted that the 
programs are typically designed solely to foster economic development rather than community 
development or poverty eradication.  In a study of 36 state programs by Avis Vidal, only eleven 
explicitly identified neighborhood revitalization or community development as a program 
objective.35  While degree of resident need (defined in terms of the local poverty rate, 
unemployment, etc.) is typically one criterion for zone designation, state-level EZs rarely require 
businesses to employ local residents as a condition to qualify for incentives (only eleven of Vidal’s 
36 do so).36  Less than half of the state programs studied even offer a wage credit for hiring local 
residents (16 of 36),37 with the bulk of incentives geared toward encouraging investment in capital 
rather than labor.  State EZs, by neglecting to target benefits to low-income residents’ needs, do not 
significantly improve the geography of opportunity in distressed communities. 
Though its basis is in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the current iteration of the Historic 
Rehabilitation Tax Credit was put in effect by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which established two 
types of rehabilitation credits: 
(1) a 10% credit for non-historic buildings constructed prior to 1936 (Non-Historic 
Rehabilitation Credit) and 
(2) a 20% credit for Certified Historic Structures (i.e., those listed in the National Register of 
Historic Places) (Historic Rehabilitation Credit).38 
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Both credits place restrictions on what rehabilitation costs are included in the basis for the credit 
calculation, and rehabilitations must be certified upon completion to ensure that they conform to 
the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation.  Since its inception in 1976, the HRTC 
has stimulated more than $31 million in private rehabilitation activity and saved more than 31,000 
historic properties.  In the process, more than 318,000 housing units have been rehabilitated or 
created (though adaptive use of non-residential structures), more than 70,000 of which are 
affordable for low- or moderate-income households.39  By promoting private investment in 
rehabilitation of historic properties – a large number of which are located in low-income urban areas 
– the HRTC can be a valuable tool for community revitalization. 
One of the oldest programs administered by HUD, CDBG was established in 1974 to 
“ensure decent affordable housing for all, and to provide services to the most vulnerable in our 
communities, [as well as] to create jobs and expand business opportunities.”40  CDBG funds are 
primarily allocated to governments in two types of communities:  entitlement communities and non-
entitlement communities.  Entitlement communities are deemed to be the most needy, and they are 
defined as center cities of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), other metropolitan cities of more 
than 50,000 people and select urban counties more than 200,000 people.41  To receive its entitlement 
grant, a community must first submit its Consolidated Plan (CP), outlining its proposed local 
programs, funding priorities and goals for CDBG and other federally funded programs.  
Additionally, the CP must provide for and encourage citizen participation, with emphasis on low- 
and moderate-income individuals.  Though a wide variety of local programs are eligible for funding, 
the CP must also demonstrate how these programs will meet the needs of low-and moderate-income 
residents or prevent or eliminate blighted or slum areas.  Similar provisions exist for non-entitlement 
communities, which may apply for funding through their respective state governments.  According 
  -13- 4/13/2004 
to HUD, CDBG “works largely without fanfare or recognition” to help local governments confront 
some of their most difficult problems and make a difference in citizens’ lives.42 
Created by Congress in December 2000, the New Markets Tax Credit allows individual and 
corporate taxpayers to receive a federal tax credit for investments in Community Development 
Entities (CDEs), which are in turn required to make qualified investments in low-income 
communities.  CDEs must meet three criteria for investments in them to be credit-eligible: 
(1) have a mission to serve low-income individuals or communities, 
(2) maintain accountability to low-income individuals through their representation on its 
governing board or advisory committee and 
(3) be certified by the Department of the Treasury’s CDFI Fund. 
CDEs can use investment proceeds to aid eligible businesses by:  providing loans or investments, 
purchasing other CDEs’ loans, providing financial counseling and other services and financing some 
of its own business activities (e.g., development and operation of a retail center).43  The tax credit 
realized by investors is equivalent to 39% of the amount invested, claimed over seven years 
(resulting in a present value of approximately 30%):  5% in each of the first three years, and 6% in 
each of the remaining four years.  In 2002 (its first allocation year), the NMTC program was 
authorized to distribute credits leading to $1 billion in private investment, with subsequent years’ 
credit amounts increasing to a maximum of $3.5 billion in 2006 and 2007 (its final years of 
authorization).44  Though still early in its existence, NMTC shows promise as “potentially the federal 
government’s most important new important economic development tool for low-income 
communities in a generation.”45 
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Residential Mobility Programs 
In contrast to community and economic development programs’ focus on developing places, 
residential mobility programs assist families in finding new housing in less segregated, non-poor 
neighborhoods, presumably with more opportunities than their current places of residence.  
Specifically, programs typically aim to: 
(1) Spatially deconcentrate inner city recipients of housing subsidies; 
(2) Socially (and often racially) integrate middle-class, suburban neighborhoods (i.e., “unlocking 
the suburban gates”46); and 
(3) Increase the degree of residential choice for subsidy recipients.47 
The presumption inherent in any residential mobility program is that living in an environment of 
concentrated poverty has negative effects on individuals, including incidence of “socially 
dysfunctional behaviors.”48  Thus, relocation to an area in which impoverished households are less 
concentrated would theoretically improve one’s quality of life (i.e., enhance his/her opportunity 
structure).  Policy makers have demonstrated increased interest in economically and racially 
integrative mobility programs because they believe movement out of existing segregated 
neighborhoods is hampered by discrimination, particularly in suburban areas.49  They assert that the 
existing housing voucher program is an insufficient mechanism for integration, because it 
overcomes a financial barrier without explicitly addressing racism.  Residential mobility programs 
can attempt to overcome this shortcoming through landlord outreach and by providing participants 
with pre- and post-move supportive services. 
To date, residential mobility programs of this type have taken two forms:  court-ordered and 
federally legislated.  The key example of each type will be reviewed here as examples of the wider 
range of programs.  The most famous court-ordered mobility program is Chicago’s Gautreaux 
Assisted Housing Program (“Gautreaux”).  The result of a series of Supreme Court decisions against 
the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
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(HUD), the Gautreaux consent decree called for relocation of 7,100 families out of highly segregated 
public housing with the use of Section 8 certificates.  Families were required to relocate to 
neighborhoods in the General Area (census tracts with less than 30% non-white population) or the 
Revitalizing Areas of the city.50  The administering agency established eligibility criteria to reduce the 
risk of “problem tenants,” by eliminating those with high debt, more than four children or 
“unacceptable housekeeping” practices.51  Program staff then provided eligible families with 
counseling services and transportation to view available apartments and encouraged participation of 
area landlords. 
After 20 years of activity, Gautreaux succeeded in moving the required number of families 
out of segregated public housing.  A comparison of families who moved to the suburbs and those 
that moved within the city (i.e., to “Revitalizing Areas”) reveals distinct economic and social 
advantages for those that left Chicago.  In terms of employment, the potentially “least employable” 
inner city residents in the study (i.e., those that had not previously worked) were more likely to find 
employment in the suburbs than in the city.52  Many suburban movers cited the larger absolute 
number of jobs (for which they were qualified) in their new neighborhoods as the primary reason 
for their success, while others mentioned improved physical safety of themselves and their children 
and the positive role models or social norms present in their new neighborhoods.53  Among those 
study participants employed prior to their moves, both city and suburban movers increased their 
hourly wages by approximately 20%.  Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum speculate that wages may have 
increased simply because participants no longer suffered the stigma of public housing, but they were 
unable to determine the validity of this conjecture.  Despite early academic difficulties, children who 
moved to the suburbs benefited from smaller class size, experienced higher levels of satisfaction 
with teachers and courses and exhibited a better attitude toward school overall.54  In later years, 
suburban Gautreaux children exhibited better educational and employment outcomes (e.g., college 
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attendance, wages, etc.).55  Though offering limited opportunity to generalize results (due to its non-
random program design), the Gautreaux demonstration illustrates the potential of residential 
mobility programs to improve the geography of opportunity for low-income individuals. 
Begun in 1998, HUD is currently at the halfway point of the first federally legislated 
residential mobility program.  Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is a ten-year demonstration in five 
large U.S. cities:  Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; New York, New 
York; and Los Angeles, California.  Though ultimately based on the same premise as Gautreaux, 
MTO differs in a number of ways.  First, Gautreaux’s focus was on neighborhoods’ racial makeup, 
while MTO emphasizes poverty status:  families from census tracts with greater than 40% poverty 
rate are required to move to tracts with less than 10% poverty rate.56  Secondly, the MTO 
demonstration was designed with applicability of results in mind.  Participants were assigned to 
groups (non-movers, “regular” Section 8 families and MTO families) randomly, and a framework is 
in place to track participant results.   
Interim results of MTO, though of limited scope, show promise for the program’s ability to 
improve very low-income families’ life experiences.  Studies indicate at least short-term benefits in 
health, safety, delinquency patterns and educational outcomes; employment and economic outcomes 
are expected to take longer to manifest themselves.57  While both the MTO and Section 8 groups 
showed improvements in neighborhood quality factors such as litter, crime, safety and police 
responsiveness, MTO families’ gains were nearly twice those of families in the Section 8 group.58  
MTO families also seem to be more satisfied with their housing and more physically and 
psychologically healthy (i.e., less obese, anxious or depressed) than either Section 8 participants or 
public housing residents included in the study.59  Moving to neighborhoods with better opportunity 
structures appears to have improved households’ quality of life. 
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While results are promising, following up with MTO families also brings to light some of the 
shortcomings of the program.  These include limited access to public transportation (particularly in 
suburban areas60) and a tendency for participant families to:  (1) stay in the city rather than move to 
the suburbs and (2) move to areas that exhibit low, but increasing, levels of poverty.61  One might 
speculate that these results are attributable in large part to households’ desire to live in 
neighborhoods in which they experience the comfort of socially likeminded neighbors (e.g., same 
race, cultural norms, etc.).  These findings indicate that defining “desirable” census tracts by poverty 
rate alone may be inadequate to achieve the desired results of a residential mobility program. 
Strengths, Weaknesses and Program Applicability 
The characteristics of community and economic development programs endow them with 
strengths and weaknesses that make them more or less viable in the context of a particular 
neighborhood.  Community development initiatives have the advantage of maintaining a sense of 
community among residents, if such a sentiment already exists.62  They also have the political benefit 
of maintaining the strength of poor minority voting blocs and their influence on mayoral and 
congressional elections in plurality or majority districts.63  Community and economic development 
initiatives aim to keep any area from “falling through the cracks” and becoming blighted, and they 
do so by working with the fabric of pre-existing communities, rather than allowing them to decay, 
then starting over. 
However, community and economic development activities are not without a downside.  If 
local officials can navigate the political terrain to target needy neighborhoods (a difficult proposition 
in its own right)64 it is often difficult to target the neediest residents of the community without 
significant benefits accruing to those who may not need assistance (i.e., “leakage”).65  In addition – 
and perhaps the most relevant to economists – there is concern that investing in non-competitive 
neighborhoods is not economically efficient and therefore not the best use of capital.66 
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Given these characteristics, community and economic development programs may be most 
viable and effective in neighborhoods in which potential exists to earn a reasonable return on 
(patient) public and private investment dollars.  Investment may be most appropriate in 
neighborhoods that are troubled but not severely distressed (i.e., still maintain a sense of 
community); play a significant role in local political decisions; contain strong local institutions 
through which investment can be funneled to the neediest residents; and possess some type of 
competitive or strategic advantage, either spatial or otherwise (e.g., access to downtown, cultural and 
educational resources, etc.). 
Because they emphasize development of individuals rather than development of place, it is 
understandable that residential mobility programs possess very different assets and challenges than 
in-place development programs.  Perhaps their primary strength is that they directly address the 
breaking down of socioeconomic and racial barriers to opportunity.  Furthermore, they do so in a 
way that does not attempt to change the pattern of physical development within a region, but 
instead help to move interested households nearer to existing economic and housing opportunities 
(a considerably less costly endeavor). 
On the other hand, mobility programs are politically quite difficult to implement, particularly 
in regions with highly fragmented governmental jurisdictions.67  Many critics argue that the programs 
do not decrease social problems in an absolute sense, but simply move them from one location to 
another,68 simultaneously removing perhaps the most capable residents from originating 
communities and burdening the public/social services of recipient communities.  Additionally, 
mobility programs are believed by some to produce “inherently unstable” outcomes, in which poor 
minority household are guaranteed entry into opportunity-rich communities, but cannot be 
guaranteed that their more advantaged neighbors will not leave as a consequence of their arrival.69 
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The strengths and weaknesses of residential mobility programs may make them ill advised at 
the neighborhood level.  Targeting a specific neighborhood for resident relocation puts that 
community in a position in which many of its residents, and particularly its most capable, are likely 
to leave.  This result can be avoided if residential mobility programs are implemented at the citywide 
or metropolitan level, and residential choice is fostered for households of all income levels.  The 
question then becomes one of what characteristics might make a city or metropolitan area most 
suitable for using a residential mobility approach.  In general, it will be those regions with a public 
transit system that provide comprehensive coverage; supportive services accessible in (or near) all 
neighborhoods; and a social climate that is relatively accepting of socioeconomic and racial diversity 
(or in which there is little visibly identifiable diversity). 
In addition to community development and residential mobility strategies described above, a 
third approach to improving the geography of opportunity, often deemed a “mobility” strategy, is 
advocated by some researchers and policy analysts.  Unfortunately, it shows little promise in getting 
at the root of the problems facing residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods.  The goal of this 
strategy is to “reconnect the ghetto to opportunity in ways that leverage a variety of local interests,”70 
including suburban employers, inner city residents and the governments of both locales.  Inner city 
residents would be linked to outside opportunities via increased information availability and support 
services (e.g., childcare), training programs and “targeted commute” initiatives.  Due at least in part 
to its higher political feasibility than the other two strategies discussed, some argue that this strategy 
is a worthwhile first step in combating socioeconomic segregation.  Others believe that it would 
prove detrimental by fostering reverse commuting and catering to a “separate but equal” mentality 
that reinforces historic patterns of segregation.  They contend that poor, predominantly minority 
workers would essentially be recipients of “day passes” to work in affluent white enclaves, creating a 
system of “American Apartheid.”71  Given the highly contentious nature and questionable outcomes 
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of this type of approach, it is not considered here as a potential response for improving the 
geography of opportunity in Milwaukee.  Milwaukee’s geography of opportunity, past and current 
efforts at enhancing this geography and future ways in which community development and 
residential mobility approaches may be used to enhance it are considered in the final three sections. 
Milwaukee’s Geography of Opportunity 
 
Milwaukee’s geography of opportunity can be characterized in terms of the extent to which 
its residential and economic opportunities are equitably distributed.  The degree to which initiatives 
are in place to combat any existing inequalities will be addressed in the next section.  The existing 
distribution of opportunities is discussed below, using 2000 U.S. Census data, third party research 
reports and discussions with stakeholders in Milwaukee’s housing and community development 
fields. 
Like many other cities in the U.S. “Rust Belt,” the City of Milwaukee – like its surrounding 
metropolitan area – has long been a racially and economically segregated city, with negative 
consequences for the opportunities of residents in various types of neighborhoods.  According to 
the 2000 U.S. Census, the Milwaukee-Waukesha PMSA has the distinction of being the most 
residentially segregated of the nation’s 43 largest metropolitan areas.72  Milwaukee also ranks among 
the top ten (seventh worst) in terms of its percent increase in segregation from 1980 to 2000; while 
residential segregation is not a new phenomenon, it has worsened in recent decades.  A report 
published by the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee’s Employment and Training Institute 
reinforces these statistics by pointing out that “only 9% of metro Milwaukee’s population – and only 
5% of the region’s whites – live on so-called ‘integrated’ blocks.”73  Though the report cites 
increasing proportions of African Americans in some block groups as a sign of integration, this 
conclusion is highly questionable, as it may instead be evidence of neighborhoods in transition and 
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the most recent cycle of “white flight.”74  Milwaukee has been, and continues to be, hyper-segregated 
at the metropolitan level. 
A study by Hughes continues with the theme of the Milwaukee metro area as hyper-
segregated, resulting in an unequal distribution of opportunities.  He points out that as of 1990, the 
central city was 26.9% African American, compared to less than 1% in the suburbs.  Figures for 
2000 are even more dichotomous; despite the suburbs’ increase in African American population (to 
1.3% of the total), the central city shifted much more dramatically, rising to 37% African American.  
The city lagged economically in the past two census years as well, showing poverty rate of 
approximately 21% in the city and 3% in the suburban areas in both years. 
Across the PMSA and within the city limits, it is still accurate to describe Milwaukee as 
hyper-segregated, in both racial and socioeconomic terms.  Combining 2000 TIGERline files and 
tract-level U.S. Census data, one can clearly identify the patterns of residential location (see 
Appendix Figs. 1 – 4).  As of the 2000 U.S. Census, Milwaukee’s African American population 
(Figures 1A and 1B) is highly concentrated within a cluster of 46 census tracts adjacent to the 
western edge of its downtown, all of which are more than 80% African American.  At the 
metropolitan level, 42% of the city’s African American population lives in a contiguous area 
comprising only 15% of its census tracts.  Furthermore, a 1994 report published  by Fannie Mae 
identified a 20-census tract contiguous area in center city Milwaukee (presumably a subset of the 46 
tracts mentioned here) as exhibiting the 3rd highest rate of poverty growth in U.S.75  Maps of poverty 
rate (Figures 2A and 2B) and income level (Figures 3A and 3B) for 1999 show similar results, with 
only minor exceptions to the city-suburb dichotomy.  High rates of unemployment (Figures 4A and 
4B) appear to be less spatially concentrated by census tract; a significant swath of the city (rather 
than the center city alone) displays unemployment above the 1999 citywide rate of 9.4%.  However, 
the stark difference between urban and suburban opportunities is well illustrated.  Generally 
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speaking, hyper-segregation applies not only to the racial makeup of the city and metropolitan area, 
but its distribution of socioeconomic groups as well. 
Given the distribution of racial and socioeconomic demographics within Milwaukee and 
across its metropolitan region, one can logically infer that the nature of opportunities also varies 
significantly across space.  Scholars argue that white (i.e., majority) residents and those with higher 
incomes generally have the opportunity to live in those parts of the city that are most desirable in 
terms of access to employment, institutions and amenities.  Translating this broad statement to the 
specifics of Milwaukee, these groups reside in the neighborhoods near the lakefront, the University 
of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and other universities, business corridors and new, high-quality home 
construction.  Conversely, African Americans (and other minorities) and low-income individuals 
have comparatively less power and live in those neighborhoods with the least resources.  They are 
the residents least able to leave or improve existing conditions, and therefore face the poorest 
prospects for life opportunities.  In Milwaukee, these neighborhoods lie predominantly in the center 
city and the northwest side.  The following section outlines place- and people-based initiatives that 
have been undertaken to equalize Milwaukee’s geography of opportunity. 
Past and Current Efforts to Enhance Opportunity in Milwaukee 
 
Community and Economic Development Programs 
To improve the geography of opportunity in the central city, the City of Milwaukee is 
engaged in several reinvestment initiatives.  These include an articulated revitalization strategy that 
includes new construction and rehabilitation activities in distressed neighborhoods.76  The city is 
using a market-based approach to development, identifying “Catalytic Project Areas” (CPAs) that 
are compact, adjacent to high-impact projects, home to strong local partners and show significant 
potential for leveraging private investment.77  These areas are targeted for clustered development 
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using the city’s allocation of federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME 
funds as well as other federal and local resources.  Their boundaries are often drawn to complement 
or co-exist with city-designated Targeted Investment Neighborhoods, which are eligible for an array 
of physical improvement programs.78  In this way, the city is aiming to concentrate and leverage its 
limited resources in the manner that will have the most impact on needy communities. 
WHEDA is another major actor in revitalizing Milwaukee’s distressed neighborhoods.  As 
the state housing finance agency, WHEDA generates its own revenue through and to finance the 
activities of three internal groups:  Credit, Servicing and Community Development (CD).  The first 
two groups underwrite and service housing- and business-related loans, while the third works 
directly with communities.  The CD group works with communities to identify needs, provide 
appropriate financial products (or links thereto) for achieving community goals and offer leadership 
and technical assistance.79 
In November 1994, WHEDA announced its five-year Urban Commitment program to spur 
$100 million in investment in Milwaukee’s central city.  The Commitment’s goals were to “improve 
and produce affordable housing, increase business and jobs, and restore economic vitality”80 in the 
20 census tracts identified in Fannie Mae’s 1994 report as the most needy.  WHEDA developed 
strong partnerships and built the initiative on market-based principles to ensure all stakeholders’ best 
interests were served.  Between January 1995 and July 2000, the Urban Commitment resulted in 
more than $265 million in total investment, approximately 90% of which came from non-WHEDA 
sources.  The figures suggest that WHEDA has developed a highly successful, market-driven model 
for community development. 
WHEDA developed a second, equally successful model in the form of its 1997 Lindsay 
Heights demonstration project.  Focusing on a narrow geographic area, WHEDA sought to test its 
theory that “well designed and constructed models [of housing] could appraise at values close to 
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production costs” and that conventional or WHEDA financing could cover the majority of 
construction costs, eliminating the need for deep government subsidies.81  After partnering with the 
city to sell vacant lots (tax-foreclosed properties) for $1 each to prospective buyers, and establishing 
minimum standards for construction and design82 and recruiting local builders to develop 
appropriate models, the infill project was begun.  By January 2004, 100 homes had been built, 
ranging in price from $90,500 to $211,300.  “Word of mouth” marketing has kept the project vital, 
with multiple inquiries received on a daily basis.83  A complementary Tax Incremental District 
(established in July 2001) offers $10,000 forgivable rehabilitation loans to existing homeowners in an 
attempt to accelerate the neighborhood revitalization effort.  Lindsay Heights is yet another example 
of a successful, largely market-driven approach to community development on the part of WHEDA. 
Across the city, non-governmental organizations are working in the community and 
economic development realm as well.  Neighborhood-based Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) are involved in a broad range of activities, including housing, resident and 
business organizing, training, technology transfer and technical assistance.84  The nature of these 
organizations dictates that their efforts be locally targeted, resulting in unique combinations of 
service type and quality in each neighborhood.  While these small, agile organizations are therefore 
better able to meet the specific needs of their target areas, they often lack sufficient resources to 
have significant impact on neighborhood problems. 
Two examples of development corporations that are active in Milwaukee’s distressed 
neighborhoods are the Martin Luther King Economic Development Corporation (MLKEDC) and 
the Northwest Side Community Development Corporation (NWSCDC).  Both groups are engaged 
in community and economic development efforts, though in different areas of the city and therefore 
with somewhat different objectives.  As such, they provide a useful illustration of the nature of 
community and economic development efforts across Milwaukee. 
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MLKEDC is located and targets its programs within Milwaukee’s center city.  According to 
the organization’s Executive Director, the neighborhood has been doing well relative to some others 
given its historic district, public infrastructure support and recent reinvestment activity.  He sees the 
EDC’s main focus as improving conditions in the neighborhood to demonstrate to the market that 
demand does in fact exist for inner city development.  MLKEDC carries out this mission through 
technical assistance to individuals and new and existing businesses, as well as through partial 
ownership of a local mixed-use Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) project.85  Similar to 
efforts by WHEDA and the city, MLKEDC’s efforts bespeak a belief in the power of market forces 
(with the aid of a non-market catalyst) to revitalize Milwaukee’s inner city.  
NWSCDC conducts its activities in the northwest corner of the city, and essentially operates 
in its target area in a similar way to that of the Department of City Development at the citywide 
level.  This position possesses both pros and cons, as the city’s laissez-faire attitude provides 
development autonomy, yet without significant resource allocation.86  Activities of NWSCDC are 
almost exclusively focused on businesses rather than housing.  In addition to administering a 
Wisconsin Works (welfare to work) contract, it provides technology transfer services, administers a 
business improvement district and operated a small business incubator in recent years.  Recent 
housing activity has been “purely accidental,” the result of mixed-use development projects.87  The 
organization takes advantage of what its Director deems “obvious opportunities” (e.g., vacant 
building as a result of plant closure) as well as specific opportunities that arise through potential 
partners and contacts.  The aim of most programs is to “hold the line” with existing businesses, 
doing what is possible at a given point in time rather than being a strategic component of a larger 
entrepreneurial or business relocation movement.  The NWSCDC relies heavily on partnership 
ventures and projects that will maintain its community’s economic viability. 
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Mobility Programs 
Like all housing authorities in the U.S., the Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee 
(HACM) administers a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (“Section 8” or “HCV”) program.  
Participating families are provided with vouchers that they may use to make up the difference 
between rent on a market-rate housing unit and 30% of their household income.88  Section 8 is 
intended to give families more choice in the location of their housing, particularly in light of the 
tendency for bricks-and-mortar public housing to be located in areas of highly concentrated poverty.  
Ideally, the program benefits families by helping them locate in neighborhoods with better 
opportunities, and benefits housing authorities by ultimately reducing the number of physical units 
they must maintain and manage. 
As in virtually all large housing authorities, HACM’s Section 8 program is well utilized.  The 
city currently administers 5,289 vouchers and maintains a waiting list of an additional 16,000 families 
(Milwaukee County administers an additional 1,800 HCVs).89  The question of whether the program 
is effective in improving the opportunity structure of participating families, however, is unclear.  
According to Steve Falek, Associate Director of HACM, the program has been effective at 
deconcentrating poverty and giving families more residential choice.  He notes that while 
approximately 95% of vouchers are used within the city limits (rather than the suburbs or even in 
other states),90 at least one HCV family lives in every census tract in the city.  Falek cites a variety of 
factors in participating families’ choice to stay in the city:  suburban zoning that precludes 
development of affordable housing units; inadequate transportation between central city and 
suburbs; importance of urban social networks (e.g., family, friends, religious institutions); and issues 
of cultural and social acceptance in suburban neighborhoods.   
Howard Snyder (Executive Director of the Northwest Side Community Development 
Corporation (NWSCDC)) is skeptical of the assertion that Section 8, as currently designed, truly 
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offers participating families a great deal of choice in Milwaukee.  While he acknowledges that tenants 
with HCVs are a critical factor in the financial feasibility of many LIHTC developments, he 
questions their impact in the context of Milwaukee’s neighborhood structure.  Snyder’s experience 
indicates that there are essentially two areas of the city in which low income, minority families can 
realistically obtain suitable housing:  the central city (in and near the 20-census tract high-poverty 
area identified by Fannie Mae) and the northwest side.  He argues that the only “choice” that HCVs 
provide central city residents is the opportunity to relocate from one low-income African American 
neighborhood to another.  The longer this remains the only “choice,” the less of an improvement it 
becomes relative to participants’ original neighborhoods.  It is very questionable whether this 
structure could be construed as a true broadening of opportunity. 
The only other residential mobility program that has been implemented in Milwaukee is a 
five-year demonstration of HUD’s Regional Opportunities Counseling (ROC) program (from 
approximately mid-1997 to mid-2002).91  HACM received a small grant to expand its HCV program 
across city boundaries into the rest of the metropolitan area by providing participating families with 
housing counseling and information services.  A broad coalition of public and non-profit entities 
was involved in implementing the program, including Milwaukee County, the suburb of West Allis 
and the Milwaukee Fair Housing Council.  Despite this level of support for encouraging moves 
beyond the city’s boundaries, the vast majority of participating families remained within the central 
city.  Despite Section 8 and ROC’s efforts to the contrary, Milwaukee has remained a hyper-
segregated city. 
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Future Efforts to Enhance Opportunity in Milwaukee 
 
Enhancing the geography of opportunity in Milwaukee is a complex undertaking that can be 
made more effective by learning from past experiences and incorporating knowledge of the city’s 
social and geographic context.  The experiences, both positive and negative, stemming from past 
development and residential mobility programs are instructive in developing future programs with 
the most potential for successful outcomes.  Awareness of the city’s geography, racial and 
socioeconomic context unsurprisingly indicates that no single program or initiative will provide a 
sufficient vehicle for enhancing the geography of opportunity.  In fact, it appears that the choice 
between place- and people-based programs cannot realistically be made on a neighborhood-by-
neighborhood basis, as I had hypothesized prior to beginning my research.  If such a granular 
approach were taken, the state of the vast majority of center city neighborhoods would likely make 
them prime candidates for a targeted mobility program like MTO.  Consequently, the 20 contiguous, 
most highly distressed census tracts would essentially be emptied, with few – if any – destination 
neighborhoods willing or able to accept their very low-income residents.  Milwaukee’s already 
unequal geography of opportunity could be exacerbated by this well-intentioned approach. 
The integrated and largely contiguous nature of Milwaukee’s distressed neighborhoods 
demands a more comprehensive strategy for improving the geography of opportunity.  To be 
effective in combating the decline that these neighborhoods continue to experience, a combination 
of mutually reinforcing place- and people-based strategies must be formulated.  It should 
incorporate an augmented citywide housing choice strategy in addition to long-term in-place 
development activities geared toward neighborhood geography and strengths.  Only if residents’ 
viable choices are maximized will the geography of opportunity be improved.  The remainder of this 
section is an evaluation of opportunities, challenges and recommendations regarding both the place- 
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and people-based components of future programs to enhance Milwaukee’s geography of 
opportunity. 
Potential for Community and Economic Development 
As the above discussion of community and economic development initiatives in Milwaukee 
begins to show, the support of city governmental agencies provides good reason to be optimistic 
about the success of future development projects.  The city of Milwaukee is currently engaged in a 
number of public infrastructure projects throughout the city, with a wide array of others in various 
stages of the planning and approval process.  Examples range from streetscape improvements and 
transit enhancements on the Near West Side, to transformation of the Beer Line “B” industrial 
corridor into a residential area, to reconstruction and revitalization of Fond du Lac Avenue and 
freeing up 26 acres of developable land through removal of the Park East freeway spur (nicknamed 
the “freeway to nowhere”).92  These types of projects send a signal to the market that the 
neighborhoods in which they are located are ripe for private investment; they are likely to provide a 
strong foundation that future development activities can build on to improve citywide opportunities. 
The success of past and current development projects also bodes well for a positive trend in 
the future.  Market-driven initiatives have achieved great success in the center city, including but not 
limited to, Lindsay Heights and other projects undertaken as part of WHEDA’s Urban 
Commitment.  Discussions with Milwaukee stakeholders found that they were unanimous in the 
belief that subsidies alone will not improve conditions in Milwaukee’s distressed neighborhoods; 
leveraging private investment continues to play an irreplaceable role in their most effective projects.  
These projects confirm the hypothesis of WHEDA and MLKEDC that a latent market for center 
city development can be tapped into if financing and support mechanisms are well thought out prior 
to implementation.93 
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Development initiatives have also reinforced the notion that broad-based community 
participation and multi-stakeholder partnerships are vital to effective project execution.  Residents 
have been organized, informed and involved as the starting point for several community 
revitalization efforts.  As a case in point, WHEDA’s development efforts in the center city have 
included educating residents on ways in which they can care for their neighborhoods and access 
public services of which they were previously unaware.94  In addition to resident involvement, multi-
agency partnerships have proven to be the linchpin to accomplishing desired results.  Recognizing 
this reality, Howard Snyder explicitly acknowledges that no single organization can feasibly play 
every role in project development; NWSCDC no longer even attempts solo efforts.95 
While the prospects for future development activities show significant promise, the 
instability of the funding stream threatens to undermine stakeholders’ efforts for enhancing 
opportunities in Milwaukee.  Across the country, the sluggish economic recovery has impeded both 
private investment and government funding for development.  Non-profit organizations have also 
seen reduced revenue, as their funding sources become more financially conservative to weather the 
economic storm.  Being a self-funded, independent agency, WHEDA is the fortunate exception to 
this larger trend.  Its continued institutional strength will be critical to consistent development 
funding. 
The second threat to community and economic development in Milwaukee’s distressed 
neighborhoods arises from the real and perceived risk of neighborhood gentrification.  While the 
opportunities available in many center city neighborhoods are noticeably improving, they have not 
crossed the dreaded threshold of gentrification.  However, if development is left unchecked, what 
was once a risk may become an unfortunate reality.  Given the history of Urban Renewal and the 
city government’s rampant use of eminent domain in the 1990s, it is understandable that 
neighborhood residents remain highly cynical of many development plans.96 
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On the other end of the spectrum, the northwest side of the city suffers from what may be 
viewed as “too little” potential for gentrification.  Because of its considerable distance from 
downtown Milwaukee (relative to distressed center city neighborhoods), less market pressure exists 
to develop underutilized or vacant properties.  This may prove a benefit if planning and subsequent 
change are allowed to occur at a more deliberate pace.  At the same time, it makes the northwest 
side less of a priority for the City of Milwaukee, as it is not viewed as being troubled enough to 
warrant significant attention or resource allocation.97  While perhaps not considered a pressing issue, 
hovering in this position of “development limbo” deprives the northwest side of the opportunity to 
stem the tide of decline. 
Future community and economic development efforts in Milwaukee should in large part 
continue to follow their current path, with a few exceptions.  Projects in the city’s most needy 
neighborhoods should obviously retain and expand on those elements that have proven most 
successful in the past.  Most organizations interviewed for this research describe a development 
model that is geared toward long-term solutions rather than short-term aesthetic or political impact.  
Representatives of both WHEDA and NWSCDC emphasized in interviews that building 
relationships and stakeholder commitment will continue to be the primary vehicle for sustaining a 
long-term presence in the neighborhoods in which they work.  Connie Pukaite of WHEDA 
specifically pointed out the importance of involving a broad range of community residents, not just 
local leaders, in development discussions.  Government and potential partner organizations (e.g., 
WHEDA, CDCs, other for- and non-profit entities) should continue to work together and with 
residents to underscore that community and economic development is an ongoing process rather 
than a short-term endeavor. 
Utilizing public-private or non-profit-private partnerships to leverage private investment has 
proven to be an effective and sustainable strategy for improving Milwaukee’s geography of 
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opportunity.  The market-driven principles behind a number of recent development efforts should 
remain a driving force in future development initiatives.  WHEDA’s success with unsubsidized 
home construction illustrates that this framework can be highly effective while minimizing the need 
for government funding.  The agency’s organizing of residents to make their neighborhoods more 
aesthetically “welcoming” to new development has also achieved the desired results.  On the 
government side, Milwaukee’s Department of City Development articulates a philosophy of 
engaging in projects that will serve as catalysts for subsequent private sector development:  projects 
that are visible, high-impact and densely clustered.98  Additional elements that may enhance the 
current market-driven model include development incentives to make target neighborhoods more 
economically attractive for developers interested in existing structure rehabilitation, mixed-income, 
infill and vacant parcel development (e.g., property tax deferral or abatement, etc.).  Providing fast-
track measures within the city government to facilitate straightforward permit approval and parcel 
assembly may also give rise to heightened interest in areas targeted for revitalization.  At the same 
time, it may be wise to monitor development projects to ensure that they do not become “too 
successful,” resulting in over-development and resident and business displacement.  
  A facet of revitalization efforts that has not been the center of attention in Milwaukee and 
truly merits more consideration is that of transitional neighborhoods.  Specifically, the northwest 
side is precariously perched on the edge of viability and distress, with NWSCDC and similar 
organizations striving to maintain the status quo.  The nature of this type of neighborhood dictates 
that local development activities, and perhaps development organizations themselves, need to differ 
from those seen in more stereotypical center city neighborhoods.  What these communities need is 
stabilization, through activities such as increasing homeownership, maintenance of deteriorating 
infrastructure and strengthening of local public schools and institutions.  City resources would be 
wisely utilized to support community and economic development efforts in these areas. 
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Steadying of the local economic and social environment of transitional neighborhoods, while 
important as an end in itself, may become even more important in the near future.  The northwest 
side is permitted to exist in its current state because it receives a steady stream of migrants from 
distressed center city neighborhoods.  Those who are able to leave the center city do so, and the 
northwest side is the only affordable option for them.  Because they have nowhere else to go, the 
quality of life in the northwest side need only be better than what residents left behind in the center 
city.  However, as center city neighborhoods become more attractive places for middle- and upper-
income residents to live, the geographic distribution of socioeconomic groups is likely to shift in one 
of two ways.  If the cost of living remains manageable in the center city, northwest side residents 
may seek to return there, leaving a demand vacuum in the northwest side.  With deteriorating 
infrastructure, substandard or outdated housing stock and amenities, it will be nearly impossible to 
generate new demand.  On the other hand, if low-income residents are in effect priced out of the 
center city market by gentrification, the northwest side could receive a rapid influx of low-income 
households.  In order to remain a viable community in the face of either of these shocks, the 
northwest side needs to build a solid social and economic foundation so that the neighborhood’s 
already perilous position is not made even more so. 
As evidenced by the successful implementation of a number of community and economic 
development programs in Milwaukee, development stakeholders are on the right path to enhancing 
the city’s geography of opportunity.  Emphasis should continue to be placed on those elements of 
past programs that have been most effective:  long-term orientation, catalytic infrastructure 
improvement, broad-based working groups (including institutions and residents alike) and market-
driven development.  In addition to applying these core principles to new projects, Milwaukee 
should consider further streamlining governmental processes and reexamining resource allocation 
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among types of city neighborhoods.  Overall, future development efforts in Milwaukee show great 
potential to enhance the city’s geography of opportunity. 
Potential for Residential Mobility 
As mentioned above, the geographic distribution of socioeconomic groups in Milwaukee is 
likely to shift as center city redevelopment makes those neighborhoods become more attractive to 
middle- and upper-income households.  This is a positive result for the center city, but may not be 
beneficial to its current low-income residents if development pressure pushes the center city housing 
market beyond their financial reach.  The northwest side is not large enough to receive the entire 
center city population, nor should it be expected to do so.  Efforts to facilitate residential mobility of 
all residents, particularly those with low incomes, need to be undertaken to provide households with 
freedom of choice and the city with a sustainable geographic array of residential submarkets. 
Residents in both the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County continue to show 
unwavering interest in Housing Choice Vouchers, the sole mobility program available to them.  
Both areas’ programs carry extensive waiting lists, indicating that a significant number of households 
want the freedom to choose their own market-rate housing unit.  For a given recipient household, 
such freedom clearly provides the vehicle to improve one’s opportunity structure and can be a very 
attractive option.  Residential mobility can also be a very attractive strategy for the city of Milwaukee 
if suburban housing markets are opened up to low-income households, reducing the city’s financial 
obligation to provide social services.  These two benefits of the HCV program make it a program 
for which demand is unlikely to decrease. 
Whether or not households in actuality have much choice in residential location is a separate, 
perhaps even more important, issue.  Financially, few neighborhoods in the City of Milwaukee are 
affordable to low-income households.99  Knowing that low-income households have few relocation 
options, attempting to relocate center city residents might appear to cynics as a “secret plan to move 
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the center city to the northwest side” 100 so that city government and colluding developers could 
benefit from redeveloping the prime real estate left behind.  Even when households’ incomes are 
sufficiently supplemented to enable them to afford neighborhoods with higher rent levels (i.e., 
through HCV), a significant portion of higher-priced neighborhoods are still not welcoming to low-
income residents, especially African Americans.  Households respond to this hostile environment by 
“choosing” not to search for housing in neighborhoods that have exhibited discriminatory 
tendencies in the past.  The ROC program was ineffective because participants chose to remain in 
the city even when given the option of suburban relocation.  Many interviewees expressed the 
sentiment that low-income African American households do not want to “move to someone else’s 
neighborhood” where they will be unwelcome.  Not only do they perceive little or no choice in 
residential location, clustering near family, friends and institutions that face similar barriers to 
mobility, but they are suspicious of the intentions of those who would “help” them gain that choice. 
If moves were in fact facilitated through a combination of rent supplement and household 
interest in participation, the problem of uneven geography of opportunity would still not be solved 
for several reasons.  First, landlords in Milwaukee neighborhoods (or suburbs) that are home to few 
low-income residents would likely be unwilling to accept low-income, subsidized tenants in lieu of 
their traditional middle- or upper-income tenants.101  Voluntary landlord participation has long 
plagued the HCV program.  Secondly, designing and implementing a residential mobility program of 
sufficient scale to have a noticeable impact on the distribution of opportunity is cost prohibitive at 
all levels of government.102  The administrative and program costs involved in assisting such a large 
number of relocations would greatly exceed the budget allocated for any such endeavor.  Finally, if 
the other barriers to large-scale relocation were removed, mass departure of households (regardless 
of their income levels, abilities, etc.) would be damaging to those households and residents 
remaining in the center city.  Neighborhoods would lose the critical mass needed for survival. 
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Despite the disappointing results of ROC, Milwaukee should take full advantage of the HCV 
program’s popularity and work to expand its scope and enhance its impact on the city’s geography 
of opportunity.  The most critical feature to keep in mind regarding the directed use of HCVs is that 
the choice that they connote is on the part of program participants regarding where to live, not on the 
part of HACM or other housing officials on where they ought to live.103  At the same time, HACM 
and coordinating city agencies would not be overstepping their bounds to provide services and 
information that would make previously untapped areas of the city more accessible (and potentially 
more attractive) to voucher-holding households.  This could be carried out through a combination 
of market-driven housing production and supplemental service provision. 
Though not strictly a residential mobility approach, LIHTC developments rely heavily upon 
HCV households to ensure the projects’ financial feasibility.104  However, in most cities, these 
developments are relatively few in number and distributed unevenly throughout the city, providing 
potential residents with limited alternatives.  Putting more LIHTC projects into service, particularly 
in neighborhoods that currently lack affordable housing, would provide HCV participants with a 
broader choice of neighborhoods in which to locate.  This might be achieved through a combination 
of developer education and incentives as well as bureaucratic streamlining.  As LIHTC development 
relies on the economic appeal of tax credits to developers, this strategic objective would mesh well 
with the above-mentioned market-based community development that is encouraged throughout the 
City of Milwaukee. 
Marketing the virtues of traditionally non-low income neighborhoods (for either LIHTC or 
market-rate housing units) has not been effective given the current array of HCV participant 
services.  HCV households tend to be uninformed regarding housing opportunities in these 
unfamiliar neighborhoods, face unreceptive landlords, have difficulty securing suitable 
transportation and often struggle with childcare obligations.  Supplementing the HCV program with 
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housing search counseling, landlord outreach and improved transportation and childcare assistance 
(through subsidies or in-kind service provision) would go a long way toward increasing voucher 
holders’ ability to live in the neighborhoods of their choice.  Though HACM currently provides a 
range of HUD- and foundation-funded supportive services (e.g., job training, economic literacy, 
etc.), obtaining additional funding, as always, is a major concern.  Again, as in the community and 
economic development model described earlier, multi-stakeholder partnerships (e.g., with the public 
transit system, fair housing advocates, etc.) may hold the key to providing more comprehensive and 
supportive services to HCV households. 
A final aspect of the HCV program that could be enhanced is its effectiveness in focusing on 
the long term.  As designed at the federal level, though they carry a renewal provision, HCVs do not 
carry a definitive time limit for eligibility.  While this provides a certain level of housing security for 
recipients, at the same time it does not provide an incentive to better one’s situation and make the 
transition to unassisted, market-rate housing.  HACM may consider repositioning local 
implementation of the HCV program as a temporary program (e.g., three- to five-year duration), 
intended to provide participants with moderate-quality market-rate housing during a transition 
period in which they receive supportive services (as above) and case management to work toward 
self sufficiency.105  In the past year 60 Milwaukee voucher-holders have become homeowners,106 
illustrating the potential for HCV participants to move from assistance to independence with the 
appropriate support framework. 
While residential mobility programs can be controversial for many reasons, they can play an 
important (though not primary) role in giving low-income residents of Milwaukee greater choice in 
residential location.  In some forms they could be viewed skeptically by their intended beneficiaries, 
particularly if specific neighborhoods are targeted for relocation.  Milwaukee’s history of hyper-
segregation will clearly also pose an obstacle to effective mobility.  However, the popularity of 
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HCVs and the prospect of enhanced services related to information, transportation and childcare 
should keep housing officials from dismissing residential mobility as a lost cause for Milwaukee.  
Residential mobility is a choice-expanding alternative for a large number of families whose 
opportunities would be diminished without the program. 
Concluding remarks 
 
Enhancing the opportunity structure faced by low-income residents of the City of 
Milwaukee is not a problem for which a single, unilaterally implemented program will be an effective 
solution.  The geography of opportunity in the city has developed through years of social and 
economic change, and therefore will require long-term, strategic effort to modify.  A complementary 
array of programs will need to be in effect at any point in time, providing households with the 
maximum range of residential choice possible.  Moreover, a wide range of stakeholders will need to 
be committed to improving conditions:  government agencies, CDCs and other non-profit 
organizations, private industry and – most importantly – residents of metropolitan Milwaukee 
themselves. 
In their commitment to improving Milwaukee’s geography of opportunity, stakeholders 
should keep two important points in mind.  First, relocating to a “good” or “better” neighborhood 
does not inherently imply a city-to-suburb move.107  Though this belief is ingrained in our collective 
consciousness, the same amenities for which many households relocate to suburban areas can now 
be found in Milwaukee’s vibrant, accessible urban neighborhoods.  Revitalization efforts have made 
in-town living a more appealing option for many households who value urban amenities including 
proximity to university communities (Milwaukee is home to more than a dozen four-year colleges 
and universities, and numerous two-year and technical schools108), entertainment and lakefront 
recreation.  Ideally, this will become increasingly apparent as community and economic development 
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initiatives within the city continue to gain momentum and visibility.  Keeping urban neighborhoods 
strong is a key component to maintaining a robust metropolitan economy.  Secondly, program 
design and especially implementation of individual projects need to be grounded in a solid planning 
process at a relatively micro level.  The City of Milwaukee includes 17 CDBG-eligible planning 
areas,109 all of which are required to formulate area plans.  Development stakeholders should take 
full advantage of these valuable inputs to the larger development agenda. 
On the most fundamental level, enhancing Milwaukee’s geography of opportunity relies on 
the principle of expanded residential choice for all of its citizens.  The city’s urban neighborhoods 
are being made an increasingly attractive option for middle- and upper-income households, 
expanding their perceived location alternatives.  At the same time, existing center city residents 
should be enabled to remain in their traditional neighborhoods and benefit from the improved 
conditions that mixed-income neighborhoods will bring.  While such economic diversity is 
frequently an ideal in center city redevelopment initiatives, achieving urban revitalization without 
gentrification is a struggle in practice.  It is questionable whether upper-income households moving 
into the city would (in effect) be willing to subsidize their lower-income neighbors through the 
property taxes assessed on their new (or rehabbed) high-end residences.  Depending on the altruism 
of urban in-migrants would be a risky venture.  Public education and marketing efforts related to 
center city redevelopment should both emphasize the benefits of mixed-income communities and 
forthrightly address the concerns of households for whom socioeconomic diversity is initially 
perceived as a negative aspect of city living (i.e., it is beyond their realm of experience and comfort).  
Non-profit involvement may also be desirable and necessary in encouraging neighborhood diversity; 
project development and management by CDCs can be a valuable tool in maintaining affordable 
housing options in neighborhoods at risk of gentrifying. 
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Finally, those low-income residents that seek to move beyond the boundaries of distressed 
neighborhoods should be empowered to relocate throughout the city and the region to the degree 
that they desire to do so.  As indicated by demographic data and confirmed by anecdotal evidence of 
past efforts, many urban and suburban neighborhoods are highly resistant to racial integration in 
their residential neighborhoods.  In Milwaukee, as in many cities with an industrial heritage, racial 
segregation has long been the norm, indicating that programs such as MTO may not be effective in 
providing a residential mobility alternative.  If residential integration is to be effective, the issue of 
integration must be approached in both economic and racial terms, by designing programs that 
address both issues, perhaps akin to the neighborhood eligibility provisions of the Gautreaux 
program.  Race will continue to be a complicating issue in resolving the disparate opportunity 
structures faced by Milwaukee residents for years to come. 
Equalizing the geography of opportunity in Milwaukee will not be a sudden phenomenon 
given the redevelopment and integration obstacles that the city faces.  Maximizing residential choice 
for all residents will be a long-term, but ultimately rewarding process requiring the committed 
resources of residents, the business community and the public sector alike. 
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